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THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE STATUTES
ON NEGOTIABLE PAPER PRIOR TO THE
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW*
Much has been said and written about the conflict of the cases on
Negotiable Instruments prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Based on the assumption that courts of the various jurisdictions had departed from the true line of the authoritative English
common law, it has been assumed that the Negotiable Instruments Law
was a codification of the common law of this country which attempted
to bring the courts back into line. Very little has appeared about the
development of the statutory background of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The purpose of this paper is to examine the growth of
legislation in the field in an effort to throw some light upon the condition of the law at the time of the adoption of the Act.
CoLONIAL DEVELOPMENT oF THE LAw AT THE TIME oF THE
REVOLUTION

As indicated elsewhere/ the laws of the colonies on the subject of
commercial paper were by no means uniform at the time of their separation from England. There were, however, a number of outstanding
features which were appearing fairly consistently throughout the colonies and which sharply distinguished the ~olonial law from that of the
mother country.
In the first place, the law of the colonies on this subject was almost
sui generis, based on early colonial statutes emanating chiefly from
New England. The law of assignment in general and commercial
paper in particular was well-established throughout the colonies. Unlike the English law, statutes giving the assignee the right to sue in his
own name almost uniformly preceded the right of a holder to cut off
defenses.
Aided also by colonial statutes, the negotiability of notes, bills of
exchange and bonds was well known throughout the colonies and had
developed at least a century ahead of the English law. In New England these advances were achieved not only by statutes, but by decisions

*·

The writer is greatly indebted to Philander S. Ratzkoff of the Boston Bar
who aided in collecting most of the state statutes cited, and to John Vance, Law
Librarian of Congress, for generous aid in investigating early statutes and te.,;ts.
1
Beutel, Colotzial Sources of the Negotiable I11strummts Law of the U11itcd
States, (1939) 34 ILL. L. REv. 137. The short resume of colonial law which follows is a summary of that article.
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of courts which were the direct successors to the staple courts of England. In other colonies the Dutch influence together with local statutes
aided the development of negotiability long before the Statute of Anne
appeared in the mother country. Instrtiments payable in goods, as well
as· money, had achieved negotiability before the Revolution, not only in
New England, but in many other colonies.· Though varying widely in
its details, as a whole it could be said that the concept of negotiability
was modern in its development, and such effect as the common law
of England had, was to retard rather than to aid the development of
colonial commercial law concepts.
MAJOR FAcTORS AFFECTING THE PosT-REVoLUTIONARY LAws ON
CoMMERCIAL PAPER

After the Revolution, the confusion in the laws of the new United
States as they affected commercial paper was accelerated by five major
influences which consistently contested for mastery of the prevailing
systems in each of the original thirteen states and the vast territories
which were thereafter admitted to statehood. These diverting influences
were: (1) the English common law, (2) the traditional law merchant,
(3) strong commercial, political and sentimental hostility to the English law, (4) the growth of new banking systems to ·regulate the precarious monetary and credit conditions which accompanied the development
of the states, and ( 5) the enactment of new statutes continuing the
influence of the colonial laws and commercial customs.
1. The Influence of the Common Law

Though at the close of the Revolution the colonies achieved their
political independence from England, it is interesting to note that they
actually became more dependent upon the English common law. This
change in attitude was accounted for by a number of circumstances.
Finding themselves in a period of chaos without any general system of authoritative laws, a number of states, by constitution or statutes,
adopted the common law of England without stopping to consider its
effect upon any particular field of the substantive law. Three of the
original states, New York, 2 New Jersey3 and Maryland,4 adopted the
English common law by constitutional provision. Four others of the
2
N. Y. CoNST. (1777) Art. XXXV (common law of England, Statutes of
England, Acts of Colonial Legislatures as of April 19, 1775).
3
N. ]. CoNST. (1776). "Common law of England as well as much of the
statute law as had been heretofore practical in this colony shall still remain in
force." Minutes of Provincial Congress of New Jersey (1789) 558.
• MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND CONST. (1776) (the common law as of
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original thirteen states, Georgia/; North Carolina,6 Pennsylvania7 and
Virginia,8 adopted the English common law by statute shortly after the
Revolution. Rhode Island9 and South Carolina10 late in the colonial
period also had adopted the English common law by statute and probably
considered it in force after the Revolution.
As to the other four, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire
and Delaware, there is considerable doubt. Since contemporary authorities seemed to regard the English common law as being in force
only so far as it was affirmatively adopted by each state, it seems clear
that the first did not formally take over the English common law. 11
Massachusetts, which throughout colonial history had been notoriously
hostile to the common law, simply adopted, by constitution, "all the
laws which have heretofore been adopted, used and approved in the
Providence, Colony or State of Massachusetts-Bay and usually practiced on in the courts of law."12 New Hampshire also merely adopted
the laws theretofore in force in the colonies.13
The Northwest Territory adopted the English common law by
statute in 179514 and most of the states carved out of it inherited the
system.15 Vermont, the first new state to be admitted to the union,
adopted the common law as of 1760.16 Many other states and territories, on being admitted to the control of the United States, also adopted
the common law ;17 but a large number of the states used the fourth
June 1, 1774); see also 1 KENT's CoMMENTARIES (Holmes 12th ed. 1873) *473 n.
• Act of Feb. 25, 1784; see 1 KENT's COMMENTARIES (Holmes 12th ed. 1873)
*473 n.
"N.C. Stat. 1778, c. 133; N.C. REv. STAT. (1837) c. 22; see also 1 KENT's
CoMMENTARIES (Holmes 12th ed. 1873) *473 n.
• Pa. Stat. 1718; 3 STATUTES AT LARGE (Busch, 1896) c. 36, p. 199 (common
law of England, but not the statutes); Pa. Acts of March, 1777, p. 4 (Act of the
province and "common law and such statutes of England as have heretofore been
in force.") See 1 KENT's CoMMENTARIES (Holmes 12th ed. 1873) *473 n.
8
Va. Acts 1789, c. 17, p. 11 ; id. 1791, c. 15, p. 10; id. 1792, p. 117; VA. STATUTEs
AT LARGE (Henning 1821) c. 5, p. 127.
• CHARTER AND Acrs OF RHODE IsLAND (Rider's Reprint 1895) p. 45; sec also
1 KENT's CoMMENTARIES (Holmes 12th ed. 1873) *473 n.
10
By an act of 1712, South Carolina adopted the English common law and a
number of statutes including the Statute of Anne. 2 S. C. STATUTES AT LAUGE
(Cooper's ed. 1836) 401 et seq.
11
See u.s. v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384, 394 (U.s. 1798); 1 SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF
LAws oF CoNNECTICUT (1796) 42 ct seq.
12
MAss. CoNST. (1781) c. 6, art. 6.
13
N.H. CoNST. (1784). 4 AMERICAN CHARTERS AND CoNSTITUTIONS (House
Documents, Vol. 90, 59th Cong., 2d Series, 1909) 2469.
10
Laws of Northwest Territory 1788-1800, 1 Pease 253.
15
For example, see Laws of Territory of Illinois (1 Pope, 1815) p. 34; Laws of
Illinois 1819, p. 3; for Ohio and Indiana sec 1 KENT's CoMMENTARIES (Holmes
12th eel. 1873) *473 n.
10
Vermont Statutes 1787, p. 30; Act of 1797, VERMONT REVISED LAws (17971808) ; see also 1 KENT's CoMMENTAUIES (Holmes 12th ed. 1873) *473 n.
17
For example, on Arkansas see Small v. Strong, 2 Ark 198, 206 (1840) ; on
Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, see 1 KENT's COMMENTARIES (Holmes 12th
ed. 1873) *473 n.
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year of the reign of James I, 1607, which marked the founding of
J amestown.18 The territory covered by the Louisiana Purchase theoretically inherited the civil law system,l9 but many of the states which
l~ter grew out of this territory specifically adopted the common law. 20
In addition to the fact that many states formally adopted the common
law, the English law was also influential because, with the exception
of Connecticut,21 there were no treatises on local law. Reports of local
cases were neglected and many of the statutes were not printed until
much later. English cases and treatises seemed to have been available
all over the colonies and were the chief sources to which the new American bar could turn for authoritative statements of the law. 22 Under
these conditions, both the courts and the bar easily fell under the influence of the King's Court.
In the light of these facts one might expect that the common law
would naturally become the basic law of each state and that after a
temporary set-back of its commercial traditions each would adopt the
English system, developing its law parallel to the English pattern and
looking to the courts of the mother country for guidance. Such has
been the accepted theory of legal history in other fields; but the law of
Negotiable Paper requires closer scrutiny.
It should be remembered that at the founding of the colonies, both
assignment and negotiation were unknown to the common law of England and that by the time of the Revolution, such law on the subject of
negotiable paper as existed in England was almost wholly statutory,
having been forced upon a reluctant bench and bar by Parliament under
the pressure of the commercial community. Foreign bills of exchange
were the only commercial paper accorded complete negotiability by the
courts of England ; bank notes, notes and perhaps inland bills were regarded as beyond the pale. If, then, the colonies adopted only the
common law of England, they got little law of negotiable paper and no
18
On Arkansas see Small v. Strong, 2 Ark. 198, 206 (1840); Laws of Northwest Territory 1788-1800, 1 Pease 253; Act of 1807, Laws of Territory of Illinois
(1 Pope, 1815) p. 34, Laws of Illinois 1819, p. 3; on Ohio and Virginia see 1
KENT'S Co!I!!I!ENTARIES (Holmes 12th ed. 1873) *473 n.; 9 VA. STATUTES AT LARGE
(Henning 1821) c. V, p. 127.
ro Colvin, The Path of the Civil Law i1~ United States, M:EMomms DE
L'ACADEMm INTERNATIONALE DE DRoiT COMPARE, Tome 2, 108, 116, 173.
"'For example, Arkansas, Missouri, Mississippi. See 1 KENT's CoM!I!ENTARms
(Holmes 12th ed. 1873) *473 n.
21
SwiFT, A SYSTEM OF LAws OF CoNNECTICUT appeared in 1796.
"'-See James, A List of Treatises Printed i1~ the British Colo1~ies and Americm~
States before 1801, HARvARD LEGAL EssAYS (1934) 159. Among these were four
texts on Bills of Exchange: Loveless Third English Edition, Tisdall (an Irishman),
Kyd (of the Middle Temple) from Third London Edition, and also a second
American Edition of the same work; see James op. cit. supra at 185, 205, 210, 211.
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recognition of simple assignment.23 However, if they also inherited
the Bank of England Act, which they clearly did not,24 and the Statute
of Anne, which in some cases they did, then they had the elements of
the law of negotiable paper, but in a much more primitive and antiquated form tha~ the rules which had been in effect under the colonial
statutes for a hundred years.
Another alternative was that the new world might adopt the English common 'law and treat the cases interpreting the English statutes
authorizing negotiable paper as evidence of the common law. This, of
course, should be recognized as bad legal theory, but it was the practice
followed in some quarters.
Massachusetts was the leading state which fell into this error.
Under its constitution it did not adopt the common law, but specifically
preserved the law as it had existed in the colonies.25 In the field of
negotiable paper at least, it was fully equipped with a system of law
far superior to that of England; but while the English source material
was easily available, Massachusetts lacked the means to inform its
bench and bar ofJ its own law. So, strange as it may seem, this state
that had led the colonies and the whole English world in the recognition
of assignment and the development of negotiable paper fell under the
influence of this type of hybrid English common law. Without adopting
any of the English statutes, it came completely under the spell of the
English cases. Although the assignment statute remained on the books
at least until 1814,26 the courts ignorantly doubted that assignment was
possible27 without a deed, and held that instruments payable in goods
"'Beutel, The Development of Negotiable Instruments in Early English Law
(1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 813.
"'The courts of the time are in great confusion as to what English statutes were
inherited by the colonies. See Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Paige 178, 198 (N.Y.
1833) ; Boehm v. Engle, 1 Dall. 15 (Pa. 1767) ; Biddle v. Shippen, 1 Dall. 19 (Pa.
1773); Morris' Lessee v. Vanderen, 1 Dall. 64, 67 (Pa. 1782); Commonwealth v.
Knowlton, 2 Tyng 530, 534 (Mass. 1807) ; Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch 292,
333 (U.S. 1815); Sackett v. Sackett, 8 Pick. 309, 317 (Mass. 1829), and authorities there cited. It is clear that they inherited all statutes specifically reenacted;
it is also arguable that where there was a blanket enactment of the common law
and British statutes to a certain date, all statutes applicable to the colonies were
also included; but in no case were statutes not applicable included. It is clear that
the Bank of England Act was not applicable to the colonies. In cases where the
English statutes, such as the Statute of Anne, were co11tra to or covered the same
field as colonial statutes, such as the Massachusetts assignment statute, there is a
difficult problem of overlapping statutes which is discussed infra.
7" See Rm:NSCH, EARLY ENGLISH CoMMON LAw IN THE AMERICAN CoLONIES
(1899) 18 et seq.; MORRIS, STUDIES lN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1930)
10 et seq. The latter brands as ignorance the theory that the common law of
England was adopted. Contra: KENT's CoMMENTARIES (Holmes 12th ed. 1873)
*472; cf. MAss. CoNST. (1781) c. 6, art. 6.
"'CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS (1814) c. 12.
:r See Perkins v. Parker, 1 Tyng 117, 123 (Mass. 1804).
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were not negotiable.28 Only on the question of negotiability of promissory notes was the colonial law able to hold its own. It is clear that the
Statute of Anne was not adopted in Massachusetts. But although the
courts realized this,29 without knowing why they did so, they continued
to regard promissory notes as negotiable, and to treat them as if the
statute had been passed.30 One commentator31 called it "sheer ignorance
of the law," but it was really only the intelligent survival of the colonial
system of commercial law, which was soon forgotten in the welter of
cases relying upon English authorities. Thereafter, the English and
post-revolutionary cases became the basis of the slow development of
a Massachusetts common law of negotiable instruments on the pattern
of the English system.
Mr. Justice Story writing his great treatises on bills and promissory notes in 1843 assumed that the Massachusetts pattern of the English system was the common law of the United States ;32 and his successors, including Dean Ames of Harvard, and most teachers of bills
and notes have fallen into the same error.33 It should be noted that
Massachusetts, far from being typical, is almost unique in its experience. Many of the states in adopting the English common law started
from entirely different premises which varied with the nature of the
adopting act, and the time chosen as the date of adoption.
There was a vast change in the English common law's attitude toward commercial paper during the time from the founding of the colonies until the Revolution. The period opened with complete ignorance
of and hostility to the law merchant, and closed under the influence of
23

Clark v. King, 2 Tyng 524 (Mass. 1807) ; Jones v. Fales, 4 Tyng 245 (Mass.

1808).
=>See Jones v. Fales, 4 Tyng 245, 254 (Mass. 1808), stating flatly that the
Statute of Anne was not adopted; cf. Coolidge v. Ruggles, 15 Tyng 387 (Mass.
1819).
""Rice v. Stearns, 3 Tyng 225 (Mass. 1807) ; see also Blake v. Sewell, 3 Tyng
556 (Mass. 1799); Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Tyng 45 (Mass. 1808). It should be
noted that these cases show litigation only on advanced questions of negotiability;
the elementary points, such as the right of a holder to sue and cut off defense, had
been settled in early colonial times.
31
Rand, in 4 Tyng 254, note (c) (Mass., 1865 ed.).
32
See STORY ON BILLS OF ExcHANGE (1843) vii; STORY oN PROMISSORY NOTES
(1845) 9, where he assumes that the English common law governs and that the
Statute of Anne was either adopted or regarded as part of the common law.
33
AMEs' CAsEs ON BILLS AN.D NOTEs, published in 1881, contains a few more
than seven hundred cases. Of these over five hnndred are English, over four
hundred of which were decided after the Revolution; and could not, therefore, have
any direct effect on the American law at that time. Each chapter is a development
of the English cases. The American cases, of which there are less than two
hundred, half of which came from Massachusetts and New York, appear at the ends
of the various divisions, and then they are used mostly to illustrate anomalous
variations from the English common law. The three most popular case books in
the field still use the same plan with a larger sprinkling of American cases and occasional references to the N. I. L.
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Lord Mansfield who was extremely friendly to the mercantile point of
view. During this time there were also passed a number of English
enabling statutes which were used as a lever by Lord Mansfield to effect
this change of attitude. Chief and most influential among these was the
Statute of Anne, passed in 1704.34 So far as the law of negotiable instruments was concerned, the date of adoption of the English common
law, and the question of whether or not the English statutes were also
adopted was vital in determining the nature of the basic law of the
·state in question. The state which adopted only the common law got
one system. Those which adopted the common law and statutes inherited quite another, and the date of adoption was also variable, affecting both of these factors. The mathematical possibilities are legion
and so were the actual adaptations.
New York took upon itself the most complete system, vi::., the
common law and statutes of England and all the colonial acts as of
1775.35 In Maryland, which adopted the common law as of 1774, the
Statute of Anne was regarded as a common law statute,30 but in North
Carolina, which adopted the common law in 1778, it was not so treated,37
South Carolina and Rhode Island had adopted the English common
law as of the first quarter of the eighteenth century, the former specifically enacting the Statute of Anne,38 the latter refusing to do so even
after the Revolution.39
States like New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Missouri and Mississippi which adopted the English common law as of dates later than
the Statute of Anne might have adopted it ;40 but in many of these states,
""For a discussion of this statutory development, see Beutel The Developmellt
of Negotiable Instruments i1L Early English Law (1938) 51 HARV. L. REV. 813,
841 et seq.
"" See note 2 supra. The colonial acts and laws being far ahead of England,
New York had a system all its own. New York specifically adopted statutes
modelled after the Statute of Anne during the colonial regime in 1770 and again
in 1773. 5 CoLONIAL LAws oF NEw YoRK (1804) cc. 1428, 1612, 63, 545. In 1767,
in Duryee v. Hopkins [MoRRis, SELEcr CAsEs OF THE MAYORS CouRT OF NEW
YoRK, 1674-1784 (1935) 523] the New York court allows a holder to sue on a
note, alleging the statute which may be either the English Statute of Anne or the
earlier New York assignment statute. Other New York colonial cases also referred to the statute. See Beutel, Colonial Sources of Negotiable In.stru111c11ts Law
of the United States, (1939) 34 ILL. L. REv. 137, 147, n. 96.
36
See Md. Declaration of Rights and Canst. (1776) ; 2 ALEXANDER,
BRITISH STATUTES IN FoRCE IN MARYLAND (Baldwin's 2d ed. 1912) 883 et seq.;
KELLY, ENGLISH STATUTES IN FORCE IN MARYLAND (1811) 268,
31
See note 6 SltPra; MARTIN, CoLLECTION OF ENGLISH STATUTES OF NoRTH
CAROLINA (1792) does not include the Statute of Anne.
"'In 1712. 2 S.C. STATUTES AT LARGE (Cooper 1836) 401 et seq.
33
See note 9 srepra. This adoption was as of 1700. After the revolution the
Statute of Anne was adopted in a form that made notes non-negotiable. Laws of
Rhode Island 1798, p. 446, § 3. But this limitation was later removed. Laws of
Rhode Island 1822, p. 355 .
.. See notes 3, 7, 16, 20 supra.
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such as Georgia, there was no need to raise the question because other
state statutes were adopted which were controlling.41
It seems clear that Virginia, Illinois, Ohio,42 and many other
states43 which started from an entirely d_ifferent premise by adopting
the English law as of the fourth year of the reign of James I, 1607,
did not receive the statute of Anne.44 In fact at this time there was
no English common law of negotiable instruments, nor were there any
specific statutes incorporating any part of the law merchant into the
law administered by the King's Courts.45 So in the field of commercial
paper, these states were either without law on the subject; or had to
look elsewhere than to the common law of England for the rules of
commercial transactions. It can thus be readily seen that even in those
states which purported to adopt the common law of England, there were
a whole series of individual common laws, each differing radically from
the others.
,
2. The Law Merchant
During the fourth year of the reign of James I and for at least
one hundred years thereafter, the courts of England recognized that
the Law Merchant was a separate system, administered by separate tribunals. It is not at all surprising to find this theory at work in the
new states of the United States. Following the English staple traditions, both Georgia46 and North Carolina47 set up a system of merchant
courts which lasted until long after the Revolution and administered
the law merchant as a separate system. North and South Carolina also
continued the courts of Pie Powder.48
The extent of the development of the law merchant in these sep41
DIGEST OF LAWS OF GEORGIA 1775-1800, p. 424; id. (1792) at p. 488; id.
(1797) at p. 627; id. (1799) at p. 698.
"' See note 18 supra.
.,. Among these might be classed such states as Indiana, West Virginia, Michigan, Kentucky and many others which derived their law directly from Virginia
or the Northwest Territory. See Riedman v. Macht, 98 Ind. App. 124, 127, 183
N. E. 807, 808 (1934) and authorities there cited.
.. One writer has gone so far as to say that this view is supported by the weight
of authority. See Note (1932) 31 MICH. L. REv. 273. But this is a highly doubtful statement in light of the fact that so many local statutory factors intervened.
.,. Beutel, The Development of N e.gotiable Instruments i1~ Early English Law
(1938) 51 HARV. L. REv. 813, 838.
.., See DIGEST OF LAws OF GEORGIA 1775-1800, p. 90 (1763); id. at p. 540
(1794) ; GA. CoNsT. (1789) Art. III, § 3.
., Acts of North Carolina 1784, c. 25, p. 41.
.cs Acts of North Carolina 1802, c. 31, p. 21 ; 3 S. C. STATUTES AT LARGE
(Cooper 1836) pp. 205, 215, 218 (1723); 4 id. at p. 558 (1783); 4 id. at 650 (1784) ;
4 id. at 653 (1785). A number of other colonies had such courts, but it is not clear
whether or not they survived after the Revolution. See BoND, INTRODUCTION, PRoCEEDINGS OF MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS 1695-1729 (1933) p. xii; 1 COLONIAL
LAws OF NEw YoRK (1896) c. 26, p. 298 (passed in 1692).
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arate courts must be left to the legal historians; but it should be noted
that in theory at least, if not in fact, the law merchant, in some of the
states, continued as a separate system of law outside of and different from
the common law (whatever that was) down to the time of the adoption of
the Negotiable Instruments Law.49 It was so recognized in section 196
of the Uniform Laws; and we have tangible evidence that at least some
of the framers of the act50 were not laboring under the illusion of the
draftsmen of the later uniform acts, 51 that the law merchant was part
of the common law.
It is not possible here to point out in detail the ultimate result of
this doctrine of separability of the law merchant; but it suffices to say
that it had an important effect on decision in some states, while in others
it was probably entirely ignored.52
3. Hostility to English Law

Another important influence against uniformity was the growing
hostility to English law which lasted late into the nineteenth century.
Shortly after the Revolution a number of states specifically repealed all
British statutes53 which of course included the Statute of Anne and
others facilitating the development of the law of negotiable paper. The
commercial community undoubtedly resented the antiquated doctrines of
the common law, and the political feeling ran high against England.
These two tendencies resulted in non-citation statutes in Pennsylvania,54 Kentucky5 5 and New Jersey56 which forbade the courts to take
notice of English common law, English cases, or any compilation,
commentary, digest, lectures, treatise, or other explanations of the
..., For examples of common statutory recognition of this distinction see the following sections of the compilations cited infra note 94: Alabama, § 869; Illinois,
§ 7, p. 2796; Iowa, §§ 3043, 3050; Michigan, § 1577; Nevada, § 2747; New Me..'l:ico,
§ 2545; New York, § 1, p. 278; Oregon, § 3188; Rhode Island, § 7, p. 494; Tennessee, § 2713; Washington, § 2192; Wisconsin, § 1675. Judicial recognition of the
difference is so well known that citations are unnecessary. See also, MECHEM oN
CoRPORATioNs (1908) § 1740 A.
.. Eaton; Decisions o1~ tlze Negotiable Instruments Act (1913) 12 MicH. L. REv.
89, 101. See also CRAWFORD, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (1st ed. 1897) 7.
"'It should be noted that the N. I. L., § 196, says: "In cases not provided for in
this act the rules of the law merchant shall govern." Other and later uniform acts
read "the rules of law and equity including the law merchant." For example, see
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 73; UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT § 56; UNIFORM
STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 18; UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING ACT §51.
"'See McCloskey, Tlze Constitutionality of Section 196 of tile Lo11isia11a Negotiable bzstrumetzts Law (1933) 8 TuLANE L. REV. 127, 135.
""1 LAws OF NEw YoRK 1783-1801, Act of March 30, 1801, c. 90, § 28, p. 358;
Laws of New Jersey 1799 (Patterson) p. 436; Acts of Virginia 1792, p. 117•
.. Acts of Pennsylvania 1810, c. 98, p. 136.
05
Acts of Kentucky 1807, p. 23 (approved Feb. 12, 1808).
""Laws of New Jersey 1799 (Paterson) p. 436.
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common law since July 4, 1776. Tennessee57 even went so far as to
pass a statute abrogating the law merchant because it was part of the
common law. These statutes were not only a passing phase of popular
resentment; there is good evidence that they were recognized and
followed by the courts.58 Under these circumstances some states were
forced, so far as the law of negotiable paper was concerned, to rely upon
local customs, colonial statutes, and state statutes which soon appeared
in abundance, and in ever widening variation.
4. The Banking Statutes
The first important post-revolutionary statutes affecting negotiable
paper were those growing out of the banking and credit situations.
Both before and after the revolution, the colonies were flooded with bills
of credit issued to pay for various wars. As indicated elsewhere these
bills were fully negotiable, but circulated at a tremendous discount. 59
In order to bolster up their credit systems, the various states immediately after the revolution began to create state banks with circulating
privileges.
Among the first to take this step was Connecticut with the creation
of the banks of Hartford, New Haven and New London in 1792.60 It
was soon followed by other states. These banks at first were chartered
by individual statutes which created a number of types of negotiable
paper. Notes and bills obligatory of the banks themselves, 61 bonds issued by the banks,62 notes and drafts payable at the bank63 were among
the commercial instruments made negotiable by these acts. Later on
the statutes in a more general form covering all banks and paper payable at banks were adopted by many states.64
To protect the banks in the privilege of circulation, many states
"'Tenn. Laws 1812, c. 72, p. 79.
"' See Chestnut Hill and Spring House Turnpike Co. v. Rutter, 4 S. & R. 6, 18
(Pa. 1818) ; Hickman v. Boffman, Hardin's Rep. 348, 365 (Ky. 1808) ; Gallatin
v. Bradford, Hardin's Rep. 365, 372 n. (Ky. 1808).
"'Beutel, Colonial Sources of the Negotiable Instmme1,ts Law of the United
States (1939) 34 ILL. L. REv. 137, 139 et seq.
co Conn. Laws 1796 (Hudson and Goodwin's ed.) pp. 42, 47, 52. See also the
provision for the Middletown bank of 1795. Conn. Laws of 1796 (Hudson and
Goodwin's ed.) p. 45.
"'Conn. Laws 1809, c. 1, p. 19 (bills and notes of ble Derby bank made negotiable); DIGEST OF ,LAWS OF MARYLAND (1799) pp. 79-80; DIGEST OF LAWS OF
SouTH CAROLINA (James 1822) p. 60.
03
DIGEST OF LAWS OF MARYLAND (1799) p. 83 (bonds and bills and notes of
Bank of Maryland made negotiable); £d. at p. 86 (identical provisions for the
Bank of Columbia).
'
03
Conn. Laws of 1796 (Hudson and Good,vin's ed.) p. 42; see also Miller v.
Riley, 12 Conn. 523 (1797).
"'Laws of Indiana 1818, p. 232; Acts of Kentucky 1806, pp. 20-21 ; DIGEST OF
LAws OF SouTH CAROLINA (James, 1822) p. 60; Acts of Virginia 1804, § 14.
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prohibited the issue of private bills of credit, 65 and promissory notes
below certain denominations. 66 Others prohibited private bills of credit
but authorized promissory notes. 67 In still others, promissory notes
were not recognized as negotiable unless payable at banks. 68 These
statutes continued to multiply and spread down to the adoption of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. In fact, this rule was applied in an Indiana case69 as late as 1934.
5. The Colonial Assignment Statutes and Stat1ttes

E1~[qrcing

Colonial

Custo-ms
The adoption of the antiquated common law by some state legislatures or courts and the anti-citation statutes in others created a demand
in the commercial community for the clarification of the law of commercial paper. The result of this pressure was the adoption of numerous statutes regulating the assignment and negotiation of commercial
paper. The most popular of these was the old Massachusetts statute of
assignments/0 adopted in various forms all over the United States,
which gave the assignee the right to sue, usually in his own name, either
with or without the right to cut off defenses. 71 The English statute of
Anne was adopted in some states, but in many others it never appeared,
since the necessity for it had disappeared with the adoption of a variation of the Massachusetts statute which was much wider in scope .
.,. The later colonial statutes are full of prohibitions of this kind, many of which
undoubtedly were carried on into statehood. For an example of such statutes set:
Conn. State Laws 1821, tit. 70, p. 360; id. at c. 2, pp. 66, 68, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 83,
85, 89.
""Laws of Connecticut 1811, c. 8, p. 73; Conn. State Laws 1821, tit. 70, p. 360.
61
9 VA. STATUTES AT LARGE (Henning, 1821) c. 24, p. 431 (1777).
08
Private banknotes made illegal. 12 VA. STATUTES AT LARGE (Henning, 1823)
c. 68, pp. 166-167 (1779). See also BRANNAN's NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
(Beutel's 6th ed. 1938) 1120.
"'Riedman v. Macht, 98 Ind. App. 124, 183 N. E. 807, 808 (1934). Sec the
additional Indiana cases cited in BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
(Beutel's 6th ed. 1938) 1120.
70
The original statute passed in 1647 read as follows: "It is ordered by the
Authority of this Court that any debt, or debts due upon bill, or other specialtie
assigned to another; shall be as good a debt & estate to the Assignee as it was to
the Assigner at the time of its assignation. And that it shall be lawful for the sayd
Assignee to sue for and recover the said debt, due upon bill, and so assigned, as
fully as the originall creditor might have done, provided the said assignment be
made upon the backside of the bill or specialtie." See THE LAW AND LIBERTIES OF
MASSACHUSETTS 1648 (Huntington Reprint 1929) 4; cf., THE CHARACTERS AND•
GENERAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS (1814) c. XII, 52; BRIGHAM, .PLYMOUTH
CoLONY LAWs (1836) 200; CoLoNIAL LAws OF MAsSACHUSETTS (1887) 10; CoLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 1660-1672 (1889) 25. For the history of the
spread of this statute in colonial times, see Beutel, Colonial Sources of the Negotiable I11stmments Law of the United States (1939) 34 ILL. L. REv. 137, 141-142.
71
The law was still indentifiable in the statute law of fourteen states at the·
adoption of the N. I. L. See Beutel, Colonial So11rces of the N cgotiablc Instru-ments Law of tlte United States (1939) 34 ILL. L. REV. 137, 142, n. 43.
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New York,. which adopted the common law by its constitution,
also specifically included the colonial statutes.72 Among these was both
the Massachusetts assignment statute allowing an assignee to sue in his
own name, 73 and also the Statute of Anne which was later re-enacted
in 1794 and 1801.74 It is doubtful therefore whether the English
common law system of negotiable paper ever prevailed in New York.
Pennsylvania, another leading commercial state of the time, had followed Massachusetts during colonial times 75 and at the revolution sanctioned both assignment and negotiation of bonds as well as simpler
forms of commercial paper.76 Under the influence of the common law
the courts temporarily reversed their trend ;77 but later, probably because of the anti-citation statutes, the reversing cases were themselves
reversed. 78 In the meantime, however, by statutory enactment the
state acquired the Philadelphia note which was negotiable if payable
in that city "without setoff or without defalcation." 79 New Jersey
adopted both an assignment statute80 and also the Statute of Anne, but
the latter81 specifically provided that notes should be non-negotiable
unless, like the Philadelphia notes, they contained the words "without
defalcation or discount." Although this is no longer necessary, it still
appears occasionally on printed forms in widely scattered parts of the
country. Virginia, as in colonial days, continued to struggle with the
problem of assignment and negotiation, constantly fluctuating between
the colonial law and the English common law.82
"See note 2 sttPra. See also 1 KENT's CoMMENTARIES (Holmes 12th Ed.
1873) *473 n.
"'1 LAWS OF THE COLONY OF NEW YORK (1896) c. 13, p. 153, adopted in 1684.
14
Statutes modelled after the Statute of Anne were adopted in 1770 and 1773, 5
CoLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YoRK (1844) cc. 1428, 1612, pp. 63, 545. After the revolution it was reenacted twice, LAWS OF NEW YoRK 1783-1801, p. 229; cf. also Laws
of New York 1783, c. 33, p. 54, and Laws of New York 1794, c. 48, p. 26.
'"See BLAIRLINN, DuKE OF YoRK's BooK OF LAws, 1676-1682 (1876) 12, 146,
210-11; LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1700-1775, C. 193, pp. 77-78, adopted in 1715.
•• See note in 1 Cranch 367, 457 (U. S. 1804); Robertson v. Vogle, 1 Dall. 252,
255 (Pa. 1788).
71
M'Cullough v. Houston, 1 Dall. 441 (Pa. 1789) ; Cummings v. Lynn, 1 Dall.
444 (Pa. 1789).
18
Bullock v. Wilcox, 7 Watts 328 (Pa. 1838).
""See BRIGHTLY, DIGEST OF LAWS .OF PENNSYLVANIA (1869) § 1. This act was
passed in 1797. See also 1 Dall. 444 n. (Pa. 1789).
"'Laws of New Jersey 1797 (Paterson), p. 254.
81
Laws of New Jersey 1799 (Paterson), pp. 341-342. This statute also provided
that inland bills of exchange for over eight dollars should enjoy the same status as
foreign bills.
82
For the colonial history see Beutel, Colonial Sources of the Negotiable Instrztments Law of the United States (1939) 34 ILL. L. REv. 137, 150. After the
Revolution in 1776, as indicated in note 18 sttpra, the state adopted the common
law and statutes of England as of 1607. In 1779 and 1786 the assignment statute
was again passed giving the assignee the right to sue in his own name subject to
discounts available before the assignment. Acts of Virginia 1786, c. 73, p. 42 ; lZ
VA. STATUTES AT LARGE (Henning 1823) c. 68, pp. 358-359. Under the statute
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The Northwest Territory not only clearly adopted the Massachusetts assignment statute, but also made inland bills assignable only.83
This statute was later adopted in many of the states which were
carved out of that territory.84 By a variation in this statute adopting
the almost universal colonial custom,85 bonds, notes and instruments
payable in money or chattels were made negotiable. 86 This law, like
the other, spread to many states,87 and instruments payable in chattels
are still negotiable in ar least Illinois and Georgia, by specific amendment to the Negotiable Instruments Law.8 S
The most sweeping of all these post-revolutionary statutes was
adopted in Georgia in 1790. It made all bonds and other specialities,
all promissory notes and liquidated demands for money or specific
articles fully negotiable by indorsement thereon. No formal requisites were mentioned, but the parties, if they desired, could restrict
negotiability by clearly indicating their intention to do so.89 Here is
complete negotiability with the presumption that all such contracts are
negotiable in the absence of clearly expressed intention to the contrary.
it was held in Overstreet v. Randolph, Wythe 47 (Va. 1789), that a bond was
negotiable to cut off the defense of fraud. In 1789 all English statutes prior to
the fourth year of the reign of James I were repealed. Acts of Virginia 1789, c.
17, p. 11. But this statute was s~spended by the Virginia Act of 1791, c. 20, p. 10,
declaring the common law and the English statutes to be in force. This in turn was
repealed in so far as it put the English statutes in force, leaving the common law
to supply the rules of decision. Following this statute, Overstreet v. Ra11dolph,
S1tjlra, was overruled and the common law was applied to both negotiation and assignment. Morton v. Rose, 2 Wash. 233 (Va. !796); and sec the note in Wythe
(Va.) 433. In the Act of 1804, § 14, notes payable at banks were made negotiable,
and in 1807 the assignment statute was again passed but it now preserved defenses.
Finally in 1818 the law was reduced to a code of seven sections, Virginia Acts 1818,
c. 52, pp. 72 et seq.
83
Laws of Northwest Territory 1788-1800, 1 Pease 360, adopted in 1799.
u Act of 1807, Laws of the Territory of Illinois (1 Pope, 1815) p. 48. Laws of
Indiana Territory 1805, c. 8, p. 6; Act of Feb. 21, 1805, 3 Acts of Ohio; repealed
by Act of June 25, 1810, 8 Acts of Ohio, p. 69.
ss See Beutel, Colonial Sources of the Negotiable bzstmmcnts Law of the
United States (1939) 34 ILL. L. REv. 137, 142-145.
""Laws of Illinois 1819, p. 3; Laws of Indiana Territory 1805, c. 8, p, 6; 8
Acts of Ohio, p. 69; repealed as to chattels by Act of February 25, 1820, 18 Acts of
Ohio, p. 163.
sr CoLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1871) §§ 243, 244 ; GA. CoDE ( 1892) § 3682 ; ILL.
STAT. ANN. (Starr and Curtis 1896) 2782, § 3, 2789, § 4; IowA CoDE ANN, (1897)
§ 3045. Cf, ARK. DIG. STAT. (1894) § 489; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1894) §§ 5012,
7515; see Culp, Negotiability of Promissory Notes Payable i1~ Specifics (1937) 9
Miss. L. J, 277, and additional authorities there cited.
83
See BRANNAN's NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw (Beutel's 6th ed. 1938) 2,
90, notes. This of course does not include full negotiability given to documents of
title which is much wider; see BEUTEL, BANK OFFICER's HANDBOOK OF CoMMERCIAL
BANKING LAW (1939) 73 et seq.
so Act of 1790, DIGEST OF LAWS OF GEORGIA 1775-1800, p. 424; Act of 1792, p.
488; Act of 1797, p. 627; Act of 1799, p, 698.
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This rule has been incorporated into the modem Uniform Laws governing bills of lading and warehouse receipts. 90
No particular purpose would be served by tracing further the development of the statutes in each state, or following particular lines of
decisions. It suffices to say that althoqgh the interpretation placed by
the courts upon the statutes were sometimes more varied than the
statutes themselves, many of the apparent inconsistencies in the holdings
of the courts _of particular states can easily be explained if they are considered in the light of the statutes then current.91
As the nation expanded westward with the admission of each state
or territory, a new set of statutes following one of the old types or
introducing new variations appeared. The net result was that the
statutes grew and increased like weeds in all the forty-eight states and
territories which constituted the continental United States at the time .
the American Bar Association recommended the adoption of theN. I. L.
STATE STATUTES AT THE TIME OF THE RECOMMENDATION

N. I. L.
When Judge Brewster, in 1898, told the American Bar Association that the N. I. L., if adopted, would reduce "the pre-existing statutory law on the subject by hundreds of pages," he spoke with admirable
restraint.92 At the time the Commission on Uniform Laws approved
Crawford's draft of the act for final adoption, every state, and the
territories which later became states in the union, had one or more
statutes attempting to regulate in whole, or in part, the law of commercial paper. These statutes, ranging from a few simple provisions on
attorney's fees, the right of an assignee to sue, and the effect of holidays
on maturity in Florida,93 to a complete codification of the subject in
the state of California, covered all the material now found in theN. I. L.
and a great deal more.
The remainder of this article will be devoted to a brief discussion
of these statutes, pointing out some of their salient features, and their
effect on the general laws in the field. For convenience, the compilations set out in the margin have been used as a basis of comparison, and
unless othenvise stated, citations refer to sections and pages in the
source book named for the particular state involved.94
"'UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPT Acr §7; cf. UNIFORM BILLs OF LADING Acr
OF THE

§ 8.

01

supra.

For an example of such an explanation of the Virginia cases see note 82

02
(1898) 21 A. B. A. REP. 315, 323; reprinted in BEuTEL, MATERIALS AND
CASES ON NEGoTIABLE PAPER (1936) 5, 9.
03
Fla. Laws 1895, p. 139; FLA. REv. STAT. (1892) 1073, 2315, 2316.
"'Alabama, ALA. CODE (1897) ; Arizona, ARiz. REv. STAT. (1887) ; Arkansas,
ARK. DrG. STAT. (1894); California, CAL. Crv. CoDE (Deering, 1897); Colorado,
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It is obviously impossible, and it would serve no useful purpose
here, to treat separately the sections of each statute and the judicial interpretations placed upon them by the various courts. Only the more
important features of the acts will be explained. First the complete
codification will be noted. Then certain groups of similar sections in
the various statutes and codes will be compared with corresponding requirements in the present statute.

States in which the Law of Negotiable Instruments was Already Codified
California, under the influence of the Field codes of the latter
part of the nineteenth century, became a leader in the movement for
the codification of the common law.95 When the California Codes were
adopted, in 18'12, the commissioners recommended a complete code on
negotiable instruments of one hundred and seventeen sections,90 copied
almost verbatim from Field's code proposed for New York. 97 This
portion of the California Civil Code was a codification of the law of
negotiable instruments, covering bills of exchange, promissory notes,
bank notes, checks, bonds, and certificates of deposit ;98 it rivals in
CoLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1891); Connecticut, CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1888); DelaM
ware, DEL. REV. STAT. (1893); Florida, FLA. REv. STAT. (1892); Geor~ia, GA.
ConE (1895) ; Idaho, IDAHO Crv. ConE (1901); Illinois, ILL. STAT. ANN. (Starr &
Curtis, 1896); Indiana, IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1894); Iowa, IowA ConE
ANN. (1897) ; Kansas, KAN. GEN. STAT. (1897, vol. 2) ; Kentucky, KY. STAT.
(1894); Louisiana, LA. REv. LAWS (1896), also VooRHIES REV. C1v. ConE (SaunM
ders, 1889), and GARLAND's REV. ConE OF PRACTICE (Woolf£, 1901); Maine, ME.
REV. STAT. (1883); Maryland, MD. ConE Pun. GEN. LAws (1888); Massachusetts,
MAss. Pun. STAT. (1882); Michigan, MICH. GEN. STAT. (Howell, 1883), also
MICH. GEN. STAT. (Howell, 1883M1889); Minnesota, MINN. GEN. STAT. (1894);
Mississippi, Miss. CoDEl ANN. (1892) ; Missouri, Mo. REv. STAT. (1889) ; MonM
tana, MoNT. CoMP. STAT. (1888); Nebraska, NEB. CoMP. STAT. (1895); Nevada,
NEV. CoMP. LAWS (1861-1900); New Hampshire, N.H. Pun. STAT. (1891); New
Jersey, N.J. GEN. STAT. (1896); New Mexico, N. M. CoMP. LAws (1897) ~New
York, N.Y. REv. STAT. (1896); North Carolina, N.C. ConE (1883); North DaM
kota, N.D. REv. CoDE (1895); Ohio, OHIO REv. STAT. ANN. (1897); Oklahoma,
OKLA. STAT. (1893); Oregon, ORE. ConE AND GEN. LAWS (Hill, 1892); PennM
sylvania, PA. D1c. LAws (Brightly, 1885), also PA. DIG. LAws (1891, 1895); Rhode
Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS (1896); South Carolina, S. C. REv. STAT. (1894); TenM
nessee, TENN. CoDE (1884), also TENN. CoDE (Supp. 1885-1893); South Dakota,
S. D. ANN. STAT. (1901); Texas, TEx. ANN. CIV. STAT. (Sayles, 1898); Utah,
UTAH REv. STAT. (1898); Vermont, VT. STAT. (1894); Virginia, VA. ConE
(1887) ; Washington, WAsH. REv. STAT. AND ConE (1896) ; West Virginia, W. VA.
CoDE ANN. (1884); Wisconsin, W1s. STAT. (1898); Wyoming, Wvo. REv. STAT.
(1899).
00
Georgia was the first state to codify the common law in 1861, but due to the
war between the states, its code had no influence. Smith, The First Codificalioll
of the S1ebsta11live Commo1~ Law (1930) 4 TuLANE L. REV. 178, 182.
'
00
See 2 REVIsED LAWS OF CALIFORNIA (1871) tit. 15, §§ 3086-3262, pp. 523549; CAL. CIV. ConE (Hart, 1876) tit. 15, 16, §§ 3086-3268, pp. 408-428.
"'Compare the Civil Code of New York (1865) tit. 15, §§ 1712-1828, pp. 522M
561, with the California codes cited supra note 96.
08
CAL. CIV. ConE (Hart 1876), § 3095.
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completeness and skill of draftsmanship both the English Bills of Exchange Act99 and the present N. I. L.
Scholars, comparing the B. E. A. with the N. I. L., have often
pointed out that although many of its details' are taken from the English law, its outline is entirely different and its scope is much wider.
The answer to the riddle of this change in outline and scope is found
in the California Civil Code. A comparison of the acts will show that
the N. I. L. adopted the California outline and not that of its British
model. The four titles of the N. I. L. are taken verbatim and in the
same order from the six Chapter headings of the California Code.100
The only differences are that Chapters III and IV of the California
Code ("III. Promissory Notes" and "IV. Checks") become Title III.
("Promissory Notes and Checks") of the N. I. L., while Chapter V.
("Bonds, Bank Notes and Certificates of Deposit") of the California
Code, which in 1896 contained only one short section,101 is omitted
from the outline. Nine out of fifteen of the Article headings of the
N. I. L. are taken almost verbatim, and in a similar order, from the
California Code. 102 That the N. I. L. uses "Title" where the California Code uses "Chapter" may be accounted for by the fact that theN. I. L.
was a complete act in itself while the California Act was only a part of a
larger codification. But the similarity does not end with the outline.
Article I of the N. I. L., which has often been criticized because it
covers the whole field of negotiable instruments instead of simply
limiting itself to notes and checks and bills of exchange as does the
English Act/03 gains its breadth of scope directly from Article I of the
California Act. The "must" sections of the N. I. L., as, for example,
Section one, "An instrument to be negotiable . . . must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money," find their
origins in the California Section 3088, "A negotiable instrument must be
made payable in money only, and without any conditions not certain
of fulfillment." This same mandatory wording, not contained in the
""45 & 46 VIC::r., c. 61 (1882), hereafter cited as the B. E. A.
100
CAL. Cxv. CoDE (Hart, 1876) pp. 408, 418, 427, 428.
101
Section 3261 : "A bank note remains negotiable, even after it has been paid
by the maker." Section 3626 was repealed July 1, 1874. See CAL. Cxv. <;:oDE (Hart,
1876) p. 428.
102
Compare N. I. L., Title I, Articles I, III, VI, VII, and Title II, Articles I,
II, III, V, VI, with CAL. Cxv. CoDE (Hart, 1876), Title XX, chapter I, Articles
II, III, IV, V, VII, and chapter II, Articles I, IV, III, V. Other articles of the
California Code, such as Chapter II, Article II ("Days of grace''), are omitted because they are only one section long and are covered in part of a single section,
such as N. I. L. § 85. The N. I. L. in substance of outline and continuity of material is much closer to the California Code than to the B. E. A., where a comparison of outline yields nothing but similarity of detail in certain sections.
102
For example, see CHAFEE.f BRANNAN's NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw
(Chafee 4th ed. 1926) 7, and the authorities there cited.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

852

B. E. A., is found throughout the other sections o£ this fundamental
article in both American codes.104
Although Mr. Crawford, the draftsman o£ the N. I. L., had a man~
date to follow the B. E. A. as much as he thought it applicable to
American conditions,l05 some sections o£ the N. I. L. are taken ver~
batinr from the California Code106 and many others which differ £rom
the corresponding B. E. A. provisions are in substance the same as
those o£ Cali£ornia.107 It might be argued that this is a mere coinci~
dence were it not £or the fact that the commissioners' notes to the N. I. L.
cite the California Code in three places and admit taking some of its
material.108 The infrequent citation is probably due to the £act that
the attention of the Uniform Laws Commission, at the time, was cen~
tered on the B. E. A. ; consequently the commissioners' notes very
naturally referred to the·English Act wherever it was pertinent. It is
significant, however, that as Judge Brewster points out, the B. E. A.
is much nearer to the continental codes than it is to the N. I. L.100 The
N. I. L., on the other hand, in its general outline and breadth o£ cod~
ification is nearer to the California code tban it is to the B. E. A.
The reason why the draftsmen forsook the narrow outline o£ the
B. E. A. and followed the broader scope of codification found in Cali~
,fornia, is to be discovered in two very important and practical features
of the contemporary law of the United States. The first was that the
California Code had already been copied in six other states,U0 so that
if the new negotiable instruments law was ever to be uniformly adopted,
it had to amount to more than a narrow and specific statute. Other~
wise the California Code which was already spreading would be its
rival, and those states which had already adopted the California model
could not easily be induced to change it. The seriousness o£ this con~
sideration is shown by the fact that California itself was one o£ the
101

CAL. Ctv. CoDE (Hart, 1876) §§ 3088, 3089, 3093; N. I. L. §§ 1, 1 (5), 5.
Brewster, (1898) 21 A. B. A. REP. 315, 320 et seq.; BEuTEL, MATERIALS AND
CASES ON NEGOTIABLE PAPER (1936) 5, 6-7.
100
For example, N. I.L. §§65(1), 65(2), and 154 are taken from §§3116(1),
3116 (2) and 3226 of the California Code.
101
Compare N. I. L. §§ 64(1), 70, 135 with§§ 3117, 3130, 3197 of the California
Code. Many other close comparisons are possible where the wording of the B. E. A.
is also similar. An interesting question, which cannot be answered at this writing,
is thus raised. Did Judge Chalmers have the California Code or the Field Code
before him when he drafted the B. E. A. in 1881 ?
101
See Commissioners' notes to N. I. L. nos. 64, 71 and 154, in BEUTEL, MA~
TERIALS AND CASES ON NEGOTIABLE PAPER (Supp. 1936) 21, 24, 44.
1
., Brewster, lac. cit. supra note 105; and see CHALMERS, BILLS OF ExCHANGE
Acr (3d ed. 1887) x1 et seq.
110
Idaho, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming, in
codes cited supra note 94.
103
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last states to adopt the N. I. L.,111 followed only by Texas112 and
Georgia.118 The second reason for adopting complete codification was
equally serious: There were statutes in all the other states and these
were so variously worded that any partial attempt at codification would
raise more interior conflicts in the states than it would settle.ll4 If,
then, uniformity was to be achieved at all, it was necessary for the
draftsmen to depart from the B. E. A. and to codify the whole law as
California had done. The significance of this departure and its effect
on the meaning and interpretation of the N. I. L. must be discussed
elsewhere; but it is still useful to examine a few illustrative details of
the condition of the statute law in all the states which 1;1ecessitated this
policy.
111

Laws of 1917, c. 64.
General Laws of 1919, p; 190.
112
Laws of 1924, p. 126. It is also significant that four other of the seven code
states were also late in passing the N. I. L. Idaho, Laws of 1903, p. 380; Wyoming,
Laws of 1905, c. 43; Oklahoma, Laws of 1909, c. 24; South Dakota, Laws of 1913, '
c. 279.
1
" The nature of this difficulty should be the subject of a different paper.
However, a few illustrations will serve to clarify the point. Many of the statutes
used such terms as "bonds and other obligations under seal" (Minnesota, § 2220);
"all bonds, bills, and notes" (North Carolina, § 41); "all promissory notes, bonds,
due bills and other instruments" (Colorado, § 243). They then proceeded to make
these instruments as negotiable as bills of exchange or as promissory notes. See
notes 134, 135 i11jra. Many states, like California, included in the term "negotiable
instrument" such iruitruments as bills of exchange, promissory notes, bank notes,
checks, bonds and certified checks. Thus the term "negotiable instrument'' had different statutory meanings in the different states. Any new statute with a new
definition of the term would give it a double meaning in any state where it had
already been defined by a whole conflicting set of parallel statutes. The alternative
would be repeal of the old statutes with the consequent dislocation of any instrument, such as a bond, which might not be included in the new statute. Partial repeal, that is, repeal of the old statutes as to instruments which were covered in the
new, would not solve the difficplty because the ones left out were often made as
negotiable as ones certain to be included in the new statute. The question of how
far the old instruments in the old statutes were governed by reference by the new
statutes would then be raised. If the new statutes repealed the old ones only in
so far as they were inconsistent, a mare's nest of interpretation as to what was inconsistent would result; the infiuence of the remaining statutes in the individual
states on the new N. I. L. would be such as to destroy any possibility of uniformity.
Those who have argued for a narrow N. I. L., covering only a few instruments, have assumed a blissful state of the common law, like that of England,
where there were no conflicting enactments outside the new statute. This assumption is unjustified as far as the United States is concerned. The draftsman, therefore, wisely did the only thing he could do: he codified the whole law of negotiable
instruments to permit the repeal of all existing statutes. For practical illustrations
of the working of this type of problem see Prudential Investment Company v. Mutual Reserve Life Insurance Company, 137 Kan. 659, 21 P.(2d) 373 (1933}, where
an old New York statute inadvertently adopted in Kansas raised such a problem.
See also BEUTEL, MATERIALS AND CASES oN NEGOTIABLE PAPER (1936) c. IX, and
authorities there cited; and for a similar mess on documents of title under substitute sections of the uniform acts, see BEUTEL, BANK OFFICERS' HANDBOOK OF
COMMERCIAL BANKING LAWS (1939) 74-76.
112
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The Statutes in Detail
Upon examining the statutes in detail one is immediately struck by
the completeness of statutory law on most of the parts of the subject
matter of negotiable instruments, and by the variation in the results obtainable in the different states under any one sub-title of the law.
Formal Requisites. Consider for example the subject of formal
requisites, which delights the heart of every teacher of negotiable instruments-the part of the field in which he usually speaks with such
confidence on the state of "the law" ; here, the statutes were myriad.
The negotiability of promissory notes was aided by statute in forty
states ;115 but the particular requirements to be met in order to achieve
that status were as the poles apart. One would suppose that a promissory note, at least, had to be in writing; but Oregon and Nevada
specifically stipulated that they might be telegraphed.116 At least five
states117 had no requirements for negotiability in the statutes other than
that the instrument should be a note, thus raising the old English question whether a note to be negotiable need not be payable to order or
bearer ;118 but here the similarity to the English common law ceased.
Twenty-two states119 stipulated that instruments payable to order or
bearer were negotiable, and at least six120 made it mandatory as does the
N. I. L. Iowa121 combined both tests and allowed negotiability of notes
payable to a person, to his order, or to bearer. Two others covered
order instruments only/2 2 while four states provided that notes payable
110
Alabama, § 869; Arkansas, § 489; California, § 3095; Colorado, § 244; Con· ,
necticut, § 1858; Delaware, p. 527; Georgia, §§ 3677, 3682; Illinois, p. 2789, § 4;
Indiana, § 7520; Iowa, § 3043; Kansas, § 1, p. 591 ; Kentucky, §§ 478, 483; Maryland, Art. 15, p. 106; Massachusetts, § 14, p. 427; Michigan, § 1577; Minnesota,
§ 2220; Mississippi, § 3502; Missouri, § 733; Montana, § 156, p. 636; Nebraska,
§ 3380 (but issue to circulate as money was a crime, section 6808).; Nevada, § 2747;
New Jersey, §2604; New Me.xico, §2545; New York, §1, p. 278; North Carolina,
§§ 41, 2286; North Dakota, § 4861; Ohio, § 3171; Oklahoma, para. 3291; Oregon,
§ 3188; Pennsylvania, § 1, pp. 188, 1369, § 2, p. 1370; Rhode Island, § 7, p. 494;
South Carolina, § 1393; South Dakota, § 5667; Tennessee, § 2713; Utah, § 1561 ;
Virginia, §2849; Washington, §2192; West Virginia, c. 99, §7; Wisconsin,§ 1675;
.
Wyoming, § 2337.
116
Oregon, § 4171; Nevada, § 1065. It should be noted that these sections also
applied to checks and due bills, but qu.aere whether the latter were negotiable.
nr Colorado, Illinois, Mississippi, Montana, and North Carolina. See their
statutes cited S1tftra note 115. The last state specifically specified that the note need
not be to order or bearer.
118
See 2 STREET, FouNDATIONS OF LEGAL LrMJILITY (1906) 386 ct seq.
119
California, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Okla·
homa, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington,
Wisconsin and Wyoming, in the sections cited S1tPra note 115.
m California, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming, in
the sections cited supra note 115.
:m Iowa, § 3043.
123
Pennsylvania and Tennessee, in sections cited srtpra note 115.
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to order or to bearer or to assigns123 were negotiable. Some states
added the requirement that notes to be negotiable should be issued
by,l24 or payable at,l2 5 or assigned by, banks. 126 There were also a number of minor special requirements, such as the necessity for the words
"value received,"127 "without defalcation or set off"128 to appear on the
instrument. On sealed instruments in North Carolina, a holder got only
the rights of the payee.129 In five states though the holder could sue
in his own name, notes were practically non-negotiable by statutory
enactment. 130
The fact that bonds had been made negotiable by colonial statutes
and early enactments in the original states caused them to retain this
quality in the early decisions. 131 Nevertheless, statutes in aid of their
negotiability were specifically enacted in twenty-one states. 132 In
six133 of these states they were subject to all the provisions of the
negotiable instruments codes just as they now are under the N. I. L.,
while in five 134 others they were negotiable in the same manner as both
bills of exchange and promissory notes. In three states135 they were
negotiable on the same basis as promissory notes, while in still three
others 13 a they had to meet special formal requisites which included the
Delaware, p. 527; Kansas, § 1, p. 591; Nebraska, § 3380; Ohio, § 3171.
Art. 15, p. 106.
""Alabama, § 869; Indiana, § 7520, loan or deposit companies also added,
§ 5012; Kentucky, § 483; Virgina, § 2849; West Virginia, c. 99, § 7.
1
"' Kentucky, § 483; North Carolina, § 2286.
127
Missouri, § 733; cf. Tennessee, § 2714.
,.. Pennsylvania, § 1, p. 1369; and perhaps New Jersey, Laws of New Jersey
1799 (Paterson), pp. 341-342.
'""North Carolina, § 41; contra in Minnesota, § 2220, where such instruments
were fully negotiable.
lo:l Arkansas, §489; Delaware, p. 527; Florida,§ 1073; Mississippi, §3503; New
Me}..-ico, § 2540.
131
E.g., Overstreet v. Randolph, Wythe 47 (Va. 1789) ; Commonwealth e~ rel
Hamilton v. City of Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. 496 (1859), and cases cited infra note 234.
132
Alabama, § 869, but bonds to circulate in place of money were penalized 50
per cent, and "change bills" and "shinplasters" were prohibited, §§ 866-868; Arkansas, § 489 (prob<!.bly affected only their assignability; California, § 3095; Colorado, §§ 243, 244; Delaware, p. 527 (assignable under seal) ; Georgia, § 3682;
Illinois, §§ 3, 4, pp. 2782, 2789; Indiana, § 7515 (But. cf. § 7516) ; Kansas, § 1, p.
591; Kentucky, § 474 (subject to defences against original obligor or assignor before notice of assignment); Massachusetts, § 4, p. 426 (where issued by corporation or joint stock company) ; Minnesota, § 2220 (where issued by corporation or
joint stock company) ; Nebraska, § 3380 (but issue to circulate in place of money
was a crime, § 6808) ; North Carolina, §50 (but if under seal indorsee got rights
of payee, § 41; North Dakota, § 4861; Ohio, § 3171; Oklahoma, § 3291; South Dakota, § 5667; Tennessee, §§ 2713, 2714; Utah, § 1561; Wyoming, § 2337.
133 California, § 3095; North Dakota,§ 4861; Oklahoma, § 3291; South Dakota,
§ 5667; Utah, § 1561 ; Wyoming, § 2337.
m Alabama, § 869; Illinois, § 3, p. 2782, § 4, p. 2789; Indiana, § 7515; Colorado,
§§ 243 244; Georgia, § 3682.
m' Massachusetts, § 4, p. 426; Minnesota, § 2220; Tennessee, § 2714.
""Kansas, § 1, p. 591 ; Nebraska, § 3380 (by this section bonds were also negotiable if payable to "assigns") ; Ohio, § 3171.
w

:~:.~Maryland,
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requirement of being payable to order or to bearer. Four states' statutes
made bonds wholly or partly non-negotiable.137
Even the lowly due bill was covered by the laws of five states.188
Two of these clearly made it negotiable ;139 and two pro~ided for making
it by telegraph, but left its negotiability in doubt.140
Since the bill of exchange was the one instrument to which the English common law from the beginning accorded the quality of negotiability, one would not expect to find many statutes prescribing its formal
requisites. But, despite this fact, fourteen states,l41 other than the
seven code states, had statutes on bills of exchange. In other words,
at least twenty-one states in all prescribed the form or negotiability of
this type of paper.142 In all except two of these,14 3 they of course had to
be in writing. Eight states required them to be to order or bearer,l44
two to order, bearer, or assigns,145 one to order,l46 and eight were silent
on this point.147 Wisconsin provided that instruments drawn upon or
accepted by officers, municipalities, and the like, should not be negotiable
unless expressly authorized by law.148
On the question of the formal requisites of acceptance, the American statutory law differed widely from the English common law. As
was the case in England before the B. E. A.,l49 it was required by
statute in twenty-four states that the acceptance of the bill be in writ131

Delaware, p. 527; Florida, § 1073 ; New Mexico, § 2540; North Carolina,

§ 41 (where holder got rights of the payee).
138

Colorado, § 243 ; Illinois, § 3, p. 2782; Nevada, § 1065; New Mexico, § 2540 ;
Oregon, § 4171.
139
Colorado and Illinois. See note 138 siiPra. It should be noted that numerous
other statutes mention "bills" together with promissory notes or bonds ; but their
framers probably had in mind either the old meaning of the term, which is synonymous with "promissory note," or the newer meaning, which is "bill of exchange."
However, they are open to the other interpretation, and here the numerous old cases
holding due bills to be promissory notes might have great significance.
1
"' Nevada and Oregon.
See note 138 supra.
141
Arkansas, § 487; Georgia, § 3676; Indiana, § 7515; Kansas, § 1, p. 591 ;
Mississippi, §3504; Montana, §156, p. 636; Nebraska, §3380; Nevada, §1065;
Ohio, § 3171 ; Oregon, § 4171; Pennsylvania, § 1, p. 188, § 2, p. 1370; Virginia,
§ 2849; West Virginia, c. 99, § 7; Wisconsin, § 1675.
1
4!1 The statutes discussed here are only those using the specific term, "bills of
exchange." Those using the ambiguous word "bills," which has often been interpreted to mean bills of e..v;change, are not considered.
1
'" Nevada, § 1065; Oregon, § 4171.
(Bills of exchange could be made by
telegraph.)
1
" California, §§ 3087, 3171, and cf. North Dakota, § 4914, Oklahoma, para.
3344, South Dakota, § 5720, Utah, § 1612, and Wyoming, § 2393; Georgia, § 3676;
Kansas, § 1, p. 591.
1
' " Nebraska, § 3380, Ohio, § 3171.
1
"' Pennsylvania, § 1, p. 188, § 2, p. 1370.
m Arkansas, § 487; Idaho, § 2911; Indiana, § 7515; Mississippi, § 3504; Montana, § 156, p. 636; Virginia, § 2849; West Virginia, c. 99, § 7; Wisconsin, § 1675.
1
.. Wisconsin, § 1675.
""See English Bills of Exchange Act (1878), 41 & 42 Vxcr., c. 13, specifically
reenacting the Mercantile Law Amendment Acts of England and Scotland of 1856.
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ing.100 But unlike the English statutes which required the acceptance
to be written on the bill/51 the American statutes all omit this requirement. Sections 133 to 135 of the N. I. L., which allow extrinsic acceptance, have often been criticized for not following the English
statute. It is well known that they were taken almost verbatim from
a New York statute152 which obviously approved the American custom
of accepting bills and checks by letter or wire and also the universal
custom of accepting bills in ~dvance by letter of credit. In addition
to New York, statutes of this nature were in force in fourteen 153
states; sections corresponding to sections 133 and 135 of the N. I. L.
were found in all fourteen, and the provisions of section 134 of the
N. I. L. were present in twelve. 154
Sections similar to 136 and 137 of the N. I. L. regulating the time
allowed for acceptance, which were copied from statutes in Massachusetts and New York respectively/ 55 appear in fifteen156 states ; but none
of the old statutes contain the neat correlation between the two sections
which appears in the N. I. L.l57'
Statutes governing the formal requisites and negotiability of checks
were not so numerous, but checks were specifically named and made
negotiable by the statutes of ten states.158 There were specifications
u.o Alabama, § 880; Arkansas, § 475; California § 3193; Connecticut, Conn.
Pub. Acts 1893, p. 40; Idaho § 2922; Kansas, § 10, p. 94; Maine, § 10, p. 335;
Michigan, § 1583; Minnesota, § 2233 ; Mississippi, § 3515; Missouri, § 719 ; N evada, § 2752; New Mexico, § 2546; New York, § 6, p. 279 ; North Dakota, § 4927;
Oklahoma, para. 3357; Oregon, § 3194; Pennsylvania, § 2, p. 188; South Carolina,
§ 1395; South Dakota, § 5733; Utah, § 1624; Washington, § 2199; Wisconsin,
§ 1681; Wyoming, § 2405.
101
See note 149 sttPra, and B. E. A. § 17 (2) (a). 45 & 46 Vxcr., c. 61 (1882).
m N. Y. REv. STAT. (1830) pt. II, tit. II,. c. 4, §§ 78 and 79; see Commissiol!er's Notes to N. I. L. §§ 133-135, BEuTEL, CAsES AND MATERIALS oN NEGoTIABLE PAPER (Supp. 1936) 39.
:u;s Alabama, § 882; Arkansas, § 478; California, § 3194; Idaho, § 2923; Kansas,
§ 13, p. 594; Mississippi, § 3515; Missouri, § 722; Nevada, § 2755; North Dakota,
§ 4928; Oklahoma, para. 3358; South Dakota, § 5734; Utah, § 1625; Washington,
§ 2202; Wyoming, § 2406.
·
""Arkansas, § 476; California, § 3196; Idaho, § 2925; Kansas, § 11, p. 594;
Missouri, § 720; Nevada, § 2753; North Dakota, § 4930; Oklahoma, para. 3360;
South Dakota, § 5736; Utah, § 1627; Washington, § 2200; Wyoming, § 2408.
=See Commissio11ers' Notes toN. I. L. §§ 136-137, cited supra note 152.
u.o Sections like N. I. L. § 136: California, § 3186; Idaho, § 2918; Massachusetts, § 17, p. 428 [cf. Amended Mass. Supp. to Stat. (1889-1895) c. 415, p. 1375];
North Dakota, § 4923; Oklahoma, para. 3353; Rhode Island, § 5, p. 494; South
Dakota, § 5729; Utah, § 1620; Wyoming, § 2400. Sections like N. I. L. § 137:
Alabama, § 884; Arkansas, § 480; California, § 3195; Kansas, § 15, p. 594; Missouri, § 724; Nevada, § 2757; New York, § 11, p. 279 ; North Dakota, § 4927;
Oklahoma, para. 3359; South Dakota, § 5735; Utah, § 1626; Washington, § 2204;
Wyoming, § 2407.
""See BRANNAN's NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw (Beutel 6th ed. 1938) 1093.
m California, §§ 3095, 3254; Idaho, § 2956; North Dakota, §§ 4861, 4964; Oklahoma, para. 3291, 3394; Pennsylvania, § 1, p. 188, § 2, p, 1370; South Dakota,
§§ 5667, 5770; Utah, §§ 1561, 1653; Virginia, § 2849; West Virginia, c. 99, § 7;
Wyoming, §§2337-2440 (cf. id. at §2442).
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in two others that they might be drawn by telegraph,tuo and they were
undoubtedly considered to be covered by statutes making "bills" payable
at banks negotiable.160 Even without specific provisions directly touching this point, many states regarded checks as a kind of bill of exchange,
subject to the statutes regulating those instruments; but this is a question of interpretation which will not be considered here.
In addition to the standard types of negotiable instruments already
mentioned, there were many others which enjoyed some or all of the
attributes of negotiability. Chief among these were the instruments
payable in goods, which had been negotiable from colonial times. Statutes giving these instruments unusual circulation still survived in seven
states.161 Negotiable instruments thus payable in goods included notes,l 62
bonds,l63 bills,l64 specialties165 and even bills of exchange.166 Such instruments in two states167 might also be payable in labor, and in one
other, bills, drafts and checks payable in depreciated bank notes or current funds were negotiable.168
Liability of Parties. On the matter of liability of parties and the
defenses which they could offer, the statutes presented an interesting
and varied picture.
In seven states presentment was not necessary to charge the principal debtor instead of the person primarily liable.1611 Presentment was
necessary before the maker of a demand note could be sued in
Maine.170 In Colorado, where the instrument was payable in goods,
tender to the payee discharged the maker and transferred title to the
goods promised. 171 And in Iowa a defrauded maker was required only
to pay a bona fide holder the amount the holder had paid for the instrument.172
1

Nevada, § 1065; Oregon, § 4171.
See notes 124, 125, 126 supra.
Arkansas, § 489 (quaere as to negotiability) ; Colorado, §§ 243, 244 ; Georgia, §§ 3677, 3682; Illinois, § 3, p. 2782, § 4, p. 2789; Indiana, § 7515; Iowa, § 3045;
Kentucky, § 474 (not fully negotiable) ; see also Beutel, Colonial Sources of the
Negotiable Instruments Law of the United States, (1939) 34 ILL. L. REV. 137,
144-146; Culp, Negotiability of Promissory Notes Payable in Specifics (1937) 9
"'

100

162

MISS.
162

L. J. 277.

Colorado, §§ 243, 244; Georgia, § 3677; Illinois, § 3, p. 2782, § 4, p. 2789;
Indiana, § 7515.
"'" Colorado, §§ 243, 244 ; Georgia, § 3682 (also judgments and e.'\:ecutions) ;
Illinois, § 3 p. 2782, cf. Archer v. Cleftin, 31 Ill. 306 (1863); Indiana, § 7515.
1
.. Colorado, § 243 ("due bills"); Illinois, § 3, p. 2782 ("due bills").
165
Georgia, § 3682.
166
Indiana, § 7515.
161
Indiana, § 7515, Iowa, § 3045. Iowa used the term "Instruments."
1
os Kentucky, § 478.
169
California, § 3130; Idaho, § 2885; North Dakota, § 4887; Oklahoma, para.
3317; South Dakota, § 5693; Utah, § 1585; Wyoming, § 2361.
170
Maine, § 10, p. 335.
171
Colorado, §§ 252, 253.
172
Iowa, § 3070.
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In the seven code states an acceptor admitted the signature of the
drawer, but not that of the indorser ;173 and in one of these,l74 he was
not liable to pay according to the tenor of his acceptance if the instrument had been raised. In these same seven code states, one who was
not a drawee could accept a bill, in which case it became a promissory
note discharging all prior parties. 175
The liability of the drawer was subject to many variations. In
one state the drawer of an unaccepted bill of exchange was primarily
liable thereon.176 In three others, he was subject to suit without notice
of dishonor,l7 7 but the rule was contra in another three where due diligence was a condition precedent to liability. 178 In the code states his liability was that of a first indorser.179
On the question of indorsers' liability, the statute makers really
had a field day. Twenty-five states had statutes creating various types
of obligations. The liabilities of indorsers of notes and bonds often
differed from those of indorsers of bills of exchange, even within the
same state.180 This liability might be primary for indorsers of unaccepted bills of exchange,l81 secondary without the necessity of protests
or notice,l 82 conditioned on due diligence,l83 or absolute upon the bring~
ing of suit against prior parties.184 So also the indorser might be liable
as a surety,IB 5 a guarantor, 186 an assignor187 or as a guarantor conditioned upon diligence. 188 The anomalous indorser found himself liable
in the same manner as any other indorser in eight states ;189 in one, such
liability attached even though the instrument was non-negotiable. 190
3
"
California, § 3197; Idaho, § 2928; North Dakota, § 4933; Oklahoma, § 3363;
South Dakota, § 5739; Utah, § 1630; Wyoming, § 2411.
110
Wyoming, § 2411.
11
" California, § 3246; Idaho, § 2960; North Dakota, § 4961; Oklahoma, para.
3391 ; South Dakota, § 5767; Utah, § 1660; Wyoming, § 2437.
110
Montana, § 159, p. 636.
111
Arizona, § 120; Ohio, § 3175; Texas, art. 306.
118
Colorado, § 241; North Carolina, § 42; South Carolina, § 1395.
""California, § 3177; Idaho, § 2916; North Dakota, § 4920; Oklahoma, para.
3350; South Dakota, § 5726; Utah, § 1618; Wyoming, § 2398.
w For example, Montana, compare § 159 with § 160, p. 636; Colorado, compare §§ 241, 242, 247; Illinois, compare § 12, p. 2801 (bearer paper) with § 7, p.
2796 (instruments payable in money).
181
Montana, § 159, p. 636; Ohio, § 3175.
182
North Carolina, §50.
183
Colorado, §§ 241, 242; Georgia, § 3688; Illinois, § 7, p. 2796; Montana,
§ 180, p. 636; North Carolina, § 42; South Carolina, § 1395.
""Arizona, § 120; Colorado, § 247; Texas, art. 306 (bills of exchange).
ISS North Carolina, §50.
""'Illinois, § 12, p. 2801.
181
Kentucky, § 481.
83
'
Indiana, § 3049.
183
California, §§ 3108, 3117; Connecticut, § 1860; Massachusetts, § 15, p. 427;
North Dakota, §§ 4868, 4877; Oklahoma, 1>ara. 3298, 3307; South Dakota, §§ 5674,
5683; Utah, §§ 1568, 1577; Wyoming, §§ 2344, 2351.
100
Connecticut, § 1860.
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In at least eight states, the indorser's liability in warranty was finnly
established by the statutes ;191 but an examination of the particular sections will reveal that the warranties were not identical. In four states
it was stipulated that the liability of indorsers on demand notes was the
same as that on time notes.192
Seventeen states had statutes whose provisions collectively covered
most of the material found in sections 25-29 and 59 of the N. I. L., but
with interesting variations. Arizona and Texas had statutes providing
that want or failure of consideration was a defense against the payee
and transferees with notice and after maturity.193 This probably accounts for one of the leading cases holding that a payee could not be a
holder in due course.194 Three other states allowed a bona fide assignee to cut off these defenses195 and one of these196 stipulated value
in addition to bona fides. Eight states197 provided that absence of consideration was no defense against a holder for value, 'thus reaching approximately the same result as section 29 of the N. I. L. In nine
states198 there was a presumption of consideration for all parties ; in
one it was clearly rebutable,l 99 and in one it appeared absolute.200
Pennsylvania had an act providing that where an instrument was forged
a holder could get his money back,201 and Arkansas and Delaware provided that, after assignment, no assignor could release any part of the
consideration.202
Rights of Holders. In thirty-five states,203 statutes gave the holder
191
California, § 3116; Georgia, § 3685; Idaho, § 2878; North Dakota, § 4876;
Oklahoma, para. 3306; South Dakota, § 5682; Utah, § 1576; Wyoming, § 2350.
192
Massachusetts, § 13, p. 427; Minnesota, § 2232; New Hampshire, § 6, p.
570 ; Vermont, § 2321 ; cf. the Illinois sections cited Sllfrra note 180 for a probable
reason for such statutes.
103
Arizona, § 128; Texas, art. 314.
.
m J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Howth, 116 Tex. 434, 293 S. W. 800
(1927).
"" Colorado, § 250 ; Illinois, § 13, p. 2802 ; Iowa, § 3070.
100
Iowa, § 3070.
w California, § 3122; Idaho, § 2882, Louisiana, § 330; North Dakota, § 4883;
Oklahoma, para. 3313; South Dakota, § 5689: Utah, § 1581; Wyoming, § 2357.
m Arkansas, § 498; California, § 3104; Georgia, § 3696; Idaho, § 2870; North
Dakota, § 4867: Oklahoma, para. 3297; South Dakota, § 5673; Utah, § 1567;
Wyoming, § 2343.
109
Georgia, § 3696.
""' Arkansas, § 498.
""' Section 10, p. 190, § 8, p. 1371.
"'"Arkansas, § 501; Delaware, p. 527.
203
Alabama, § 28; Arizona, § 121; California, § 3120; Colorado, § 245; Delaware, p. 527; Florida, § 1073; Georgia, § 3698; Idaho, § 2881; Illinois, § 5, p. 2795;
Indiana, § 7516; Kansas, § 8, p. 594; Michigan, § 1579; Minnesota, § 4994; Mississippi, §§ 3503, 3504; Missouri, § 734; Montana, § 156, p. 636; Nebraska, § 3381 ;
Nevada, § 2750; New Jersey, § 1, p. 2604; New Mexico, § 2540; New York, § 4,
p. 278; North Carolina, § 41 ; North Dakota, § 4880; Ohio, § 3172; Oklahoma,
para. 3310; Oregon, § 3190; Pennsylvania, § 1, p. 1369; South Dakota, § 5686;
Tennessee, § 2715; Texas, art. 307; Utah, § 1580; Vermont, § 2306; Washington,
§ 2195; Wisconsin, § 1678; Wyoming, §§ 2354, 2442.
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of negotiable instruments, or of a particular type of negotiable instrument, the power to sue thereon in his own name; but this might have
been subject to the real party in interest statutes in at least two states.204
Althpugh the term "holder in due course" had not yet appeared
in the statutes, the seven code states used the expression "indorsee in
due course."205 Thus by implication or direct provision, 206 they excluded the payee from this charmed circle. Such a bona fide transferee
for value specifically cut off defenses, set-offs and defects of title in
whole or in part under the statutes of fifteen states.207 In nine states,
he could recover on instruments void for various kinds of illegality ;208 but in eight others,209 the holder in due course was specifically
subject to one or more defenses which he now cuts off under the N. I. L.
The holder of overdue paper was made the subject of special
regulation in twenty-one states, but his rights were as varied as Joseph's
coat. In five states the purchaser, after maturity, took subject to the
defenses existing against the payee. 210 In Illinois he was subject to the
defense against the payee and all intermediate holders.211 Six other
states provided that instruments· were subject to set-off and defenses
existing against the transferor, but that if they were negotiated before
maturity, this rule did not apply.212 Five prescribed that the purchaser
after maturity was subject to the set-offs or discounts that were good
against his assignor.213 In Minnesota usury made an instrument void
as against a purchaser after maturity no matter what its previous history had been,214 while in three states illegality seems to have been cut
""Arkansas, § 5623; Arizona Seventeenth Territorial Session Laws (1893) p.

17, tit. 20, c. 680, § 32. Cf. Aruz. REv. STAT. (1887) § 121.

"""California, § 3123; Idaho, § 2883; North Dakota, § 4884; Oklahoma, para.
3314; South Dakota, § 5690; Utah, § 1582; Wyoming, § 2358.
""' North Dakota, § 4884.
207
Alabama, § 3733 ; Arizona, § 681 ; Arkansas, § 492; California, § 3124;
Georgia, § 3694; Iowa, § 3461 ; Montana, § 5, p. 61 ; North Carolina, § 177; North
Dakota, § 4885; Oklahoma, para. 3315; Oregon, § 28; South Dakota, § 5691;
Texas, art. 307; Utah, § 1583; Wyoming, § 2359.
003
California, § 3124; Iowa, § 2423; Massachusetts, § 5, p. 522; Maine, § 56,
p. 312, § 10, p. 913; Minnesota, §§2214, 6594; North Dakota, §4885; Oklahoma,
para. 3315; South Dakota, § 5691 ; Utah, § 1583.
:>JO North Carolina§ 41 (seal same rights as payee); Pennsylvania, § 1, p. 1369
(negotiable with certain words); Illinois, § 14, p. 2808, and Minnesota, § 2239
(subject' to something like fraud in the factum); Indiana, §§ 7517, 7518, Mississippi, § 3503, New Mexico, § 2540, and probably Delaware, p. 527 (many otherwise negotiable instruments, wholly or partly non-negotiable).
"""Colorado, § 248; Georgia, § 3695; Kansas, § 2, p. 591; Nebraska, § 3383;
Ohio, § 3173.
211
Illinois, § 15, p. 2811.
=Arizona, § 681 ; Colorado, § 251 ; Iowa, § 3461 ; Montana, § 5, p. 61 ; North
.
Carolina, § 177; Oregon, § 28.
213
Arizona, § 121; Illinois, § 16, p. 2811; MrcH. GEN. STAT. (1883-1890) § 7635;
Minnesota, § 4994; Texas, art. 307.
-"'• Minnesota, § 2214.
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off by any good-faith purchaser without notice. 215 In the seven code
states, an indorsee of a check, after its apparent maturity but without
notice of dishonor, got the same rights as a purchaser before maturity.216 In this connection it should be noted that it was not uncommon for different rules to exist in the same state for different types of
paper.
Payment to one not a holder W¥ no defense in one state.217 In
two others,218 payment after notice of assignment was ineffective, but
a purchaser with notice of payment apparently took subject to it in five
states.219
In three of the code states, discharged instruments were revived
in favor of an indorsee in due course. 220
Maturity and Diligence. Every state in the union, with the possible
exception of Kentucky, had one or more statutes affecting the manner
of calculating the maturity and time of payment of negotiable instruments. These statutes varied both as to details and general principles
and also as to the type of paper involved. Different kinds of instruments were often subject to different rules in a single state, and even
practices in counties or cities within some states were governed by varying statutory provisions.221 Where the date of maturity fell on Sunday or a holiday, twenty-three states222 postponed it to the day following, while fifteen states223 placed it on the preceeding day. In six others
it might fall either on the preceeding or following day depending upon
215
Massachusetts, § 5, p. 522; Maine, §§ 10, 56, pp. 913, 312; Minnesota, § 6594
(gambling).
216
California, § 3255; Idaho, § 2957; North Dakota, § 4965; Oklahoma, para.
3395; South Dakota, § 5771; Utah, § 1664; Wyoming, § 2441.
211
Arizona, § 501.
=Colorado, § 246; Illinois, § 6, p. 2795.
219
Colorado, § 249; Illinois, § 17, p. 2812; Kansas, § 3, p. 592; Nebraska,
§ 3384; Ohio, § 3174.
zn North Dakota, § 4913; Oklahoma, para. 3343; South Dakota, § 5719.
221
For example, see Maryland, §§ 9, 10, p. 116, Md. Laws 1892, c. 462, p.
656, id. 1894, c. 167, p. 221, id. 1894, c. 510, p. 747; Pennsylvania, § 1, p. 1369,
Laws of Missouri 1895, p. 47, cf. Mo. REv. STAT. (1889) § 737.
222
Alabama, § 872; Arizona, § 2070; California, § 3132; Conn. Pub. Acts 1893,
p. 463, repealing previous rule (see CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1888) § 1862) ; Idaho,
§ 2887; Illinois, § 21, p. 2813; Iowa, § 3053; Massachusetts, c. 333, p. 1051 ;
Mich. Pub. Acts 1893, no. 185, p. 299; Nebraska, § 3387; New Mexico, § 2544;
New York, §§25-27, pp. 281-2; North Dakota, §4889; Ohio, §3177; Oklahoma,
para. 3319; Pa. Sess. Laws 1895, § 2, p. 2661; Rhode Island, § 9, p. 494; South
Carolina, §1404; South Dakota, §5695; Vermont, §§2314, 2317; Virginia, §2844,
p. 412; Wisconsin, § 1684; Wyoming, § 2363.
223
Arkansas, § 481, Ark. Laws 1895, p. 192-193; Colorado, § 255; Delaware,
pp. 527-8; Florida, §§ 2315, 2316; Indiana, § 7531; Minnesota, § 2230; Mississippi,
§3514; Montana,§ 158, p. 636; Nevada, §2766; New Hampshire, §2, p. 569; New
Jersey, §14, p. 2606; TENN. ConE (Supp. 1885-1893) §2723; Vermont, §2318;
West Virginia, c. 99, § 3; Wyoming, §§ 2390-2391.
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the type of paper or the locality involved. 224 Seven states gave the
Saturday half holiday treatment similar to that accorded Sunday.225
Thirteen states had statutes providing for maturity of demand
paper, which ranged from ten days after issue to the date of demand.226
The matter of maturity and diligence was further complicated by
the existence of days of grace, now happily abolished, which allowed
a further time after maturity for the presentment, payment, or protest
of instruments. At least forty-one states227 had statutes touching on
this subject. They ranged from a small minority abolishing the custom
entirely,228 or abolishing it for one or more classes of commercial paper,
to those allowing as much as four days additional time. 229 It was not
at all unusual to find statutes in the same state allowing different types
of grace on various classes of paper, or at the will of the parties.230 In
fact the matter was so complicated that it is difficult to understand pow
business men in many states could safely present paper for payment
without first obtaining legal advice.
""'Georgia, compare § 3692 with § 3693; Maryland, compare §§ 9, 10, p. 116,
Md. Laws 1892, c. 462, p. 656, Md. Laws 1894, c. 167, p. 221, id. c. 510, p. 747;
Missouri, § 737, Laws of Missouri 1895, p. 47; Utah, § 1587; cf. also Vermont and
Wyoming at sections cited supra notes 222 and 223.
"""Conn. Pub. Acts 1893, p. 463; Georgia, § 3693; Md. Laws 1892, c. 462, p.
656, Md. Laws 1894, c. 167 (cf. id. c. 510, p. 747); MAss. PuB. STAT. (Supp. 18891895) c. 201, p. 1299, id. at c. 415, p. 1375; Mich. Pub. Acts 1893, no. 1851, p. 299;
New York, §§ 25, 27, pp. 281, 282; Rhode Island, § 9, p. 494.
""" In the code states the times ranged from ten days on non-interest bearing
bills of exchange to one year on interest bearing notes and drafts ; California,
§§ 3134-3136; Idaho, §§ 2889-2891; North Dakota, §§ 4891-4893; Oklahoma, para.
3321-3323; South Dakota, §§ 5697-5699; Utah, §§ 1589-1591; Wyoming, §§ 2365,
2366; see also Connecticut, § 1859 ; Massachusetts, § 12, p. 427; Minnesota, § 2231 ;
Missouri, §736; New Hampshire, §5, p. 570; Vermont, §2320.
""'Alabama, §§ 869-871; Arizona, § 132; Arkansas, § 488; California, § 3181 ;
Colorado, § 254; Connecticut, § 1861, Conn. Pub. Acts 1895, p. 463; Delaware p.
525; Georgia, §§ 3679, 3680; Idaho, § 2910; Illinois, § 19, p. 2813; Indiana, § 7S28;
Iowa, §§ 3050, 3051; Kansas, §§ 4, 5, p. 592; Louisiana, §§ 331, 332, 324, 1114;
Maine, § 9, p. 334; Me. Acts and Resolves 1893, c. 298, p. 354; Md. Laws 1896, c.
106, p. 140; Massachusetts, §§ 9, 10, p. 427; Michigan, §§ 1581, 1582, 1587; Minnesota, §§ 2237, 2238; Mississippi, § 3508; Montana, § 157, p. 636; Nebraska, § 3382;
Nevada, §2767; New Hampshire,§ 1, p. 569; New Jersey, §§3, 4, p. 2604, §22,
p. 2607; New York, §1, p. 829, §§20, 21, p. 281; North Carolina, §43; North
Dakota, § 4921; Oklahoma, para. 3351 ; Oregon, § 3193, Gen. Laws of Oregon
1893, § 3192, p. 104; Pennsylvania, § 4, p. 188, Pa. Sess. Laws 1895, §§ 1, 2, p.
2661 ; Rhode Island, § 4; South Carolina, § 1399; South Dakota, § 5727; Tennessee, § 2722; Texas, art. 318; Utah, § 1611 ; Vermont, §§ 2316, 2319; Washington,
§ 2197; Wisconsin, § 1680; Wyoming, §§ 2387-2389.
""' There were only eight such states : California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois,
North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Wisconsin (sections cited supra note 227).
"""See Me. Acts and Resolves 1893, c. 298, p. 354.
""The majority of the states were probably in this condition. For specific
examples see Colorado, Dela,vare, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
which distinguished between demand and sight instruments, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming, all at sections cited S1tjJra note 227.
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Even in England the law on presentment, protest, and notice of
dishonor was largely statutory in its origin and development ;231 and
the states on this side of the ocean also found the statutes their chief
source of law on this subject. In addition to statutes on days of grace,
all but eleven232 of the states had enactments which covered, among
their collective provisions, almost every detail now found in the sixtythree sect1ons of theN. I. L. on the subject. To cite the various provisions of these laws in detail would serve only to burden further an
already too tedious discussion of antiquated statutes; but one desiring
to do so may find here a fruitful field of research which will yield a
maze of conflicting and detailed rules that would delight the heart of
the most pedantic scholar, and which confounded the business community.
CONCLUSION

No purpose would be served by citing and discussing at length
many other state statutes appearing in one or more states which governed various special aspects of negotiable paper; but it is worthy of
remark that these states were so numerous that their citations would
constitute a volume of material nearly equal to that of the ones already
covered. Each with its own detailed provisions added just a mite to
the general confusion that was the law of commercial paper in the
United States.
In a situation of this sort, it is doubtful whether any generalizations
are possible, but a few may be suggested. The basic common law of
negotiable paper of each state was statutory in its origin. Its nature
depended upon the date and wording of the enabling statutes which
differed radically in their results in various states. The early court
decisions thereafter were influenced by remnants of colonial laws and
customs which had no counterpart in England, but which developed
into a multitude of conflicting statutes adopted to meet local conditions.
Without discussing the various conflicting decisions on points not directly covered by statutes in particular states-they are familiar to every
student of bills and notes-, it should be noted that due to the courts'
habit of following or ignoring statutes without citing them, 233 much of
= The following are a brief list of authorities which played an active part in
developing the English Law: 9 & 10 WM. III, c. 17 (1698); 3 & 4 ANNE, c. 9,
§ 4 (1704) [broadly construed in Heylyn v. Adamson, 2 Burr. 669, 2 Kenyon 379
(1758)] ; 7 & 8 GEo. IV, c. 15 (1827) ; 9 GEo. IV, c. 24 (1828).

= The states where such statutes seem to have been lacking are Colorado,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, Ore·
gon, Washington and Wisconsin, but one cannot say categorically that these states
were entirely without statute law on the subject because all but Kentucky had
statutes on days of grace which often had a vital effect in practice.
""'For a discussion of this tendency see Beutel, The Necessity of a New Technique of Interpreting the N. I. L. (1931) 6 TuLANE L. REV. 1, 5, and articles by
Mr. Eaton there cited.
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what has been taken for common law in various states is the direct result of decisions applying these statutes234 or following cases in other
states which relied upon the statutes.235 Finally, the laws on the statute
books governing negotiable instruments were in fundamental conflict on
almost every question of importance to the commercial community. Under these circumstances, to talk about a common law of bills and notes
in the United States is to indulge in a form of transc~ndental nonsense
which often yields ridiculous results.236
FREDERICK K. BEUTEL
CoLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY.
=:u For e..xample, in Steffen and Russell, The Negotiability of Corporate Bonds
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 799, 803, the authors state that "bonds payable to bearer and
under seal were uniformly held negotiable." Yet five of the cases on point which
they cite were controlled directly by statutes usually cited therein. See Chaplin
v. Vermont and Massachusetts Ry., 74 Mass. 575, 577 (1857); Morris Canal Banking Co. v. Fisher, 9 N.J. Eq. 667, 698 (1855); Ohio e% rel. Garrett v. Van Home,
7 Ohio St. 327, 330 (1857) • Commonwealth e% rel. Hamilton v. City of Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. 496 (1859) (citing no act. B1tt see Bunting's Administrators v.
Camden and Atlantic Ry., 81 Pa. 254, 255 (1876), where the court cites the controlling act of 1715).
""'For example, see CAMPBELL, CASES ON BILLs AND NOTEs (1928) 159 n,
stating that in Alabama notes were negotiable by common law, citing Dunn v.
Adams, 1 Ala. 527, 529 (1840). It is interesting to observe that the case involved
a Georgia note which had been made negotiable by the statute of that state, see
note 89 srtpra. For other examples, see Commonwealth e% rel. Hamilton v. City
of Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. 496 (1859), and Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 119, 128, 167
(1859), relying on Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwell, 21 How. 539
(U. S. 1858), both decided under statutes, but cited by Steffen and Russell, lac. cit.
srtfrra note 234, as if they were common law cases.
""'For example, see Deuselman v. Brazier, 193 Mass. 588, 79 N. E. 812 (1907),
holding that days of grace still existed in New York though they had been abolished by statute twenty-two years before (see New York § 1, p. 829) and again
with the adoption of the N. I. L. (Laws of New York 1897, c. 612, § 85) ; cf.
the more sensible result in Gleason v. Thayer, 87 Conn. 248, 87 Atl. 790 (1913).
See also Crume v. Brightwell, 69 Ind. 404, 122 N. E. 230 (1919), holding that the
common law of Georgia was the law merchant, and that by the law merchant
notes could not be negotiable; both assumptions being fallacious. Notes were
negotiable at law merchant; but Georgia had no common law on the subject.
Negotiability of notes had been settled there by the statutes for one hundred and
twenty years. See note 89, sr1Pra. See also the authorities and comment in
BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRm.IENTS LAW (Beutel, 6th ed. 1938) 1120.

